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European Central Bank working paper series 47ABSTRACT
Announcing a quantitative objective for price developments has become a common practice in modern
monetary policy making. While the specific features of such announced objectives vary across countries,
a common rationale for this is to help anchoring inflation expectations. We use survey data on long-term
inflation expectations in 15 industrial countries since the early nineties to investigate how well anchored
are inflation expectations. We find that in all countries except Japan long-term inflation expectations are
well anchored and, generally, increasingly so over the past decade. When comparing this evidence across
types of announcements of the inflation objectives, we find that the specific features of announcements
have no visible effect on the performance at anchoring inflation expectations. In particular, there does not
seem to be evidence that the announcement of a quantitative objective in the form of a point or of a range
for admissible inflation rates makes any appreciable difference.
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The announcement of a quantitative target is believed to be a powerful instrument for anchoring inflation
expectations, providing a device for co-ordinating price and wage setting behaviours and thus for
facilitating the conduct of monetary policy by the central bank. This papers attempts to shed light on the
effects of central banks choosing (or eschewing to choose) a specific format for expressing or announcing
their quantitative of objective for steering price developments. For this, three types of information are
considered. First, we collect a description of practices and definitions of the quantitative objective for
price developments by the central banks of 15 industrialised countries. Second, we provide an overview
of the academic literature that considers economic implications of choosing different formats. Third, we
attempt to assess the effects in practice of different formats chosen for the quantitative objective, for the
anchoring of longer-term inflation expectations.
As regards the review of practices by major central banks in this respect (which is provided in Section 2
of the paper), we note that over the past fifteen years there has been a growing tendency among central
banks to explicitly announce numerical targets for their objective of price stability. This reflects the
widely shared consensus that price stability should be the ultimate objective of monetary policy. The
announcement of a quantitative target is believed to be a powerful instrument for anchoring inflation
expectations, providing a device for co-ordinating price and wage setting behaviours and thus for
facilitating the conduct of monetary policy by the central bank. At the same time, while the
announcement of quantitative targets is common to many central banks, the specific features of the
announced targets vary across the different countries. The various practices include the announcement of
a quantitative definition of price stability and inflation targets in the form of point or ranges for
admissible inflation outcomes. Moreover, central banks in some countries have chosen not to announce
quantitative objectives but have defined price stability only in qualitative terms.
When looking at the debate on the pros and cons of the different choices of a format for the quantitative
objective – in particular with a view to the arguments for specifying a range or a point objective for
inflation – the following points seem to emerge. The announcement of a range (rather than a point)
permits the central bank to clearly signal the uncertainty surrounding future price developments and the
imperfect controllability of inflation, particularly at short horizons. Moreover, a range may give more
flexibility to accommodate possible moderate and gradual variations in the optimal inflation rate over
time. On the other hand, a possible drawback of a range objective is that the bounds of the range may be
seen as implying “hard edges”, i.e. thresholds values which trigger actions in a quasi-automatic fashion. A
point objective may be preferable in this respect. Moreover, a point objective probably increases the
signalling properties of the announcement, as it may provide a more precise focal point for the
expectation formation mechanism of agents in the economy.
Finally, this paper uses survey data on long-term inflation expectations in 15 major developed countries
since the early nineties to investigate how well inflation expectations are anchored in practice. The
ECB • Working Paper No 273 • September 2003 5empirical evidence suggests that in all countries, with the exception of Japan, long-term inflation
expectations are well anchored and, generally, increasingly so over the past decade. This is indicated by
both a low and generally decreasing volatility of expectations and a low and a generally decreasing
degree of correlation between revisions in short-term and long-term inflation expectations.
When comparing this evidence across types of announcements of the inflation objectives, we find that the
specific features of such objectives have no visible effect on the performance at anchoring inflation
expectations. In particular, there does not seem to be evidence that the announcement of a quantitative
objective in the form of a point or of a range for admissible inflation rates makes any appreciable
difference. As regards the euro area, indicators point at a very low volatility of long-term inflation
expectations since 1999, at levels which are comparable to those of the best performing countries. With
regard to the two countries in our review where no numerical value for the inflation objective was
announced, the United States and Japan, inflation expectations appear to be well anchored in the former
but not in the latter.
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As a result of the widely shared consensus that price stability is the ultimate objective of monetary policy,
over the past fifteen years there has been a growing tendency among central banks to explicitly announce
numerical targets for their objective of price stability. This trend is part of a wider process of
transformation of the overall monetary policy framework, which has witnessed the acquisition by central
banks of a high degree of independence and, in parallel, the adoption of a more open approach in the
conduct of monetary policy. In this context, the announcement of quantitative definitions of price stability
and explicit numerical targets for inflation is seen to be instrumental for a higher transparency of the
policy framework and thereby for the accountability of the central banks. Moreover, the announcement of
a quantitative target is believed to be a powerful instrument for anchoring inflation expectations,
providing a device for co-ordinating price and wage setting behaviours and thus for facilitating the
conduct of monetary policy by the central bank.
This paper reviews the different practices and operational concepts which are used to define the objective
of maintaining price stability in 15 major developed countries and the performance of these countries in
anchoring long-term inflation.
1  While the announcement of quantitative targets is common to many
central banks, the specific features of the announced targets vary across the different countries. The
various practices include the announcement of a quantitative definition of price stability and inflation
targets in the form of point or ranges for admissible inflation outcomes. Moreover, central banks in some
countries have chosen not to announce quantitative objectives but have defined price stability only in
qualitative terms.
When looking at the debate on the pros and cons of the different choices – in particular with a view to the
arguments for specifying a range or a point objective for inflation – the following points seem to emerge.
The announcement of a range (rather than a point) permits the central bank to clearly signal the
uncertainty surrounding future price developments and the imperfect controllability of inflation,
particularly at short horizons. Moreover, a range may give more flexibility to accommodate possible
moderate and gradual variations in the optimal inflation rate over time. On the other hand, a possible
drawback of a range objective is that the bounds of the range may be seen as implying “hard edges”, i.e.
thresholds values which trigger actions in a quasi-automatic fashion. A point objective may be preferable
in this respect. Moreover, a point objective probably increases the signalling properties of the
announcement, as it may provide a more precise focal point for the expectation formation mechanism of
agents in the economy.
Overall, the choice of the specific features of the announced objectives reflects the above trade-offs and
appears to be inextricably linked to the overall policy framework and monetary policy strategy followed
by the different central banks, in particular with regard to the specific mandates and the chosen horizon
for the conduct of monetary policy. Using survey data on long-term inflation expectations, we evaluate
the empirical evidence regarding the capability of the various countries in tightly anchoring inflation
                                                     
1  The review also includes countries currently in the euro area for the period prior to 1999.
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long-term inflation expectations are well anchored and, generally, increasingly so over the past 15 years.
This is indicated by both a low and generally decreasing volatility of expectations and a low and generally
decreasing degree of correlation between revisions in short-term and long-term inflation expectations.
When comparing this evidence across types of announcement of the inflation objective, we find that the
specific features of such objectives have no visible effect on the performance at anchoring inflation
expectations. In particular, there does not seem to be evidence that the announcement of a quantitative
objective in the form of a point or of a range for admissible inflation rates makes any appreciable
difference. As regards the euro area, indicators point at a very low volatility of long-term inflation
expectations since 1999, at levels which are comparable to those of the best performing countries. Finally,
the two countries in our review where no numerical value for the inflation objective was announced, the
United States and Japan, represent two extreme cases. While in the former country the tightness of
inflation expectations is comparable to that of the best performing countries, in the latter expectations
exhibit a relatively high volatility.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the different practices and
operational concepts adopted by major central banks in defining their primary objective of maintaining
price stability. Section 3 analyses the main rationales, proposed either by the central banks or by outside
observers, which may lie behind such choices, in particular with regard to the choice of specifying a range
or a point objective for price developments. In Section 4, using survey data on long-term inflation
expectations, we evaluate to what extent inflation expectations are well anchored in the various countries.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2.  Overview of international practice
Table 1 below presents an overview of the basic features of the objectives announced in major developed
countries around the world. While in all countries price stability represents a primary goal for monetary
policy, actual practices vary somewhat across countries, ranging from no explicit quantitative definition
to explicit quantitative definitions and inflation targets in the form of point targets or ranges for
admissible inflation outcomes. In terms of the announcement of objectives for price developments we can
distinguish between:
Central Banks that have not announced a quantitative target (the Federal Reserve System and the Bank
of Japan).
In the United States there is a broad consensus that price stability deserves primary attention of monetary
policy authorities.
2 The US Federal Reserve System (Fed), however, has not set an explicit, numerical
objective for price stability. In the early 1990s, the Fed Chairman A. Greenspan clarified that price
                                                     
2  In the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 (the Humphrey-Hawkins Act) a legal foundation is provided by
stating that: "The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain
long-run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase
production, so as to promote the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates."
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level of prices in their decisions”.
3 Later on he clarified that while price stability is the ultimate objective
of the Fed, the difficulty to pin down exactly this notion (mainly due to the existence of significant
measurement problems) prevents the Fed to adopt a specific numerical target.
4
In the same vein, in Japan no explicit quantitative definition has been adopted by the Bank of Japan (BoJ)
so far. For decades the BoJ has referred to price stability as a “prerequisite for sustainable economic
growth and a primary objective for monetary policy”. On 13 October 2000 the Policy Board of the BoJ
made an attempt to clarify the definition of price stability for Japan “as an environment where economic
agents including households and firms can make decisions regarding such economic activity as
consumption and investment without being concerned about the fluctuation of the general price level”.
The BoJ has recently justified its unwillingness to provide a quantitative definition of price stability on
the ground that the recent situation in Japan is characterised by exceptional economic conditions and
unusual price developments.
Central Banks that have provided a quantitative definition of price stability (the euro area and
Switzerland):
For the euro area, the Governing Council of the ECB announced the quantitative definition of price
stability on 13 October 1998 as: “Price stability shall be defined as a year-on-year increase in the
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%”. The ECB clarified that the
use of the world “increase” excludes deflation from the definition and that moreover the lack of an
explicit lower bound in the definition reflects the acknowledgement of the existence of an unknown (but
likely small positive) and possibly time varying measurement bias in the HICP.
5 Price stability has
therefore been defined in the form of a range for allowable inflation rates.
In Switzerland, the Swiss National Bank has provided an explicit quantitative definition of price stability,
which is fully equivalent to that of the ECB. It has defined price stability as an increase in the CPI for
Switzerland of less than 2%.
                                                     
3  See Greenspan, A. (1994), Statement before the Subcommittee on Economic Growth and Credit Formulation of the
Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, February 22, 1994.
4 “[…]  the Federal Reserve can be quite explicit about its ultimate objectives – price stability and the maximum sustainable
growth in output that is fostered when prices are stable. By price stability, however, I do not refer to a single number as
measured by a particular price index. In fact, it has become increasingly difficult to pin down the notion of what constitutes a
stable general price level”. […]. “For all these conceptual uncertainties and measurement problems, a specific numerical
inflation target would represent an unhelpful and false precision. Rather price stability is best thought as an environment in
which inflation is so low and stable over time that it does not materially enter into the decisions of households and firms.”
Remarks by Chairman A. Greenspan “transparency in monetary policy” at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic
Policy Conference, October 11, 2001.
5  See ECB (1999), “The stability-oriented monetary policy strategy of the Eurosystem,” ECB Monthly Bulletin, January 1999.
See also W. Duisenberg (2001): “The ECB’s monetary policy strategy and the quantitative definition of price stability”, letter
of the President of the ECB to the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Mrs. Christa Randzio-
Plath, 13 December 2001, and W. Duisenberg (2001): “The ECB’s quantitative definition of price stability and its comparison
with such definitions or inflation targets applied in other large economic areas”, letter of the President of the ECB to the
Chairperson of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Mrs. Christa Randzio-Plath, 16 October 2001,
www.ecb.int.
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COUNTRY INDICATOR NUMERICAL VALUE
DEFINITION/TARGET
EX-ANTE HORIZON 




Euro area HICP Below 2% (since 1999)
Definition of price stability








Memo item: Euro area countries prior to 1999
  (3)
Finland CPI (about) 2 %
Objective for 1998
Focus on two years
ahead inflation forecast
France CPI Not exceeding 2%
Objective for 1998
Inflation in the year
concerned
Germany Not specified 2% before 1997
1.5 – 2% for 1998
“inflation norm”
Annual monetary target Monetary
developments in the
year concerned
Italy CPI Not exceeding 2%
Objective for 1998
Spain CPI 3.5%-4% (Jan. 95-96:Q1)
3%-3.25 % (96:Q1-97:Q1)
below 3% during 1997
below 2.5%-2.75% for late
1997
2% for 1998
Inflation in the year
concerned




2½% with a fluctuation
margin of ±1%
Target





Sweden CPI 2% with a fluctuation
margin of ±1% (Jan.95-
now)
Target






Switzerland CPI Below 2%
Definition of price stability
Medium term with a
focus on three years
ahead inflation forecast
Medium term





1%-4% (Oct. 92-June 97)
2.5 % 
(1) , (June 97-now)
Target
Medium term (with a





2. Other OECD countries:
Australia CPI 2 – 3%, (Jan. 1993-now) Medium term On  average  over  the
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DEFINITION/TARGET
EX-ANTE HORIZON 
















then renewed, and valid up
to end-2006).
Target
Medium term with focus
on six to eight quarters
ahead





New Zealand CPI (excluding
credit services)












(prior to Nov. 2002:




CPI between 1-3% on
average over the
medium term)
United States Not specified
Focus on several
inflation measures




Notes to Table 1: (*) Ex ante horizon: the horizon over which the central bank will seek to pursue its objective or re-establish it
after a shock has occurred. Accountability  ex post: the time period over which the central bank is to be held accountable. (1) If
inflation as measured by the RPIX is more than one percentage point above or below the target of 2.5%, the Governor of the
Bank of England needs to write an Open Letter of explanation to the Chancellor. (2) Timeless horizon implies that, in principle,
the inflation target has to be maintained at all times. Escape clauses: when explicit contingencies under which a temporary
deviation from price stability can be allowed are provided. (3) When adopting the broad economic policy guidelines in July 1995
the Ecofin indicated that a value of 2% would be the maximum rate of inflation compatible with price stability. This was
reconfirmed in the 1998 guidelines. (4) The Chairman of the US Fed, Alan Greenspan, stated that "price stability obtains when
people do not consider inflation a factor in their decisions”. (5) The BoJ has defined price stability "as an environment where
economic agents including households and firms can make decisions regarding such economic activity as consumption and
investment without being concerned about the fluctuation of the general price level".  (6) On 19 March 2001 the BoJ announced
that it will continue its policy of quantitative easing “until the CPI registers stably a zero percent or an increase year on year”.
Central banks that specified inflation targets (all remaining non-euro area countries shown in Table 1).
Following the practice initiated by New Zealand in 1990, over the last decade a large number of countries
have announced explicit inflation targets in the form of point targets or ranges, in the context of a general
ECB • Working Paper No 273 • September 2003 11process of reform of their monetary policy framework.
6 It should be noted that in many cases initially a
clear distinction was made between the “inflation targets” and the ultimate price stability objective. In the
context of the gradual process of disinflation in many countries at the beginning of the 1990s, the former
was seen as instrumental for achieving the latter. As many countries have reached and announced very
low inflation targets in the meantime, these are nowadays seen more as an operational definition of the
ultimate objective of price stability.
7
Starting from non-European countries, in Canada an agreement between the central bank and the finance
ministry sets price stability as the principal objective for monetary policy. To implement this objective,
the agreement specifies a target range for CPI inflation of 1 to 3% with a focus on the midpoint of the
range. In Australia, the central bank has set an inflation target with a range of 2 - 3% for the CPI, which
applies to the average inflation rate over a business cycle. In New Zealand, the numerical inflation target
is set jointly by the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the central bank in the context of the Policy
Target Agreement (PTA). The new PTA signed in November 2002 requires the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand to keep future CPI inflation in the range 1 - 3% on average over the medium term (the target was
previously set at 0-3% since 1996).
Turning to European (non euro area) countries, in the United Kingdom the Chancellor has mandated the
Bank of England to pursue a point target for RPIX inflation of 2.5%.
8 This point target has remained
unchanged since 1997.  In Norway, the target for CPI inflation is set at 2.5% with a fluctuation margin (or
tolerance band) of ±1%. Finally, in Sweden a point target for CPI inflation of 2% with a fluctuation
margin of ±1% has been adopted.
Table 1 also reports (when made explicit) the horizon for the conduct of monetary policy, trying to make
a distinction between an ex ante dimension (i.e. the time frame over which the central bank will seek to
pursue its objective in a forward-looking manner) and the ex post dimension (i.e. the horizon over which
the central bank wishes/is to be held accountable).
9 Broadly speaking all central banks recognise that, due
to the occurrence of unforeseeable shocks and the existence of significant lags in the transmission of
monetary policy impulses, it would be impossible to keep inflation at the desired level all times or to
bring it back to the desired level in a very short time. Moreover, it is widely recognised that a gradual
response of monetary policy to some specific shocks (mainly of a cost-push nature) is required in order to
avoid imparting an unnecessarily high volatility in output and interest rates.
                                                     
6  For a detailed review of the experiences with inflation targeting see Bernanke, S.B., T. Laubach, F.S. Mishkin and A.S.
Posen (1999), “Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience,” Princeton University Press, Princeton.
7  Clearly, in countries (such as some Eastern Europe or Latin America countries, not reviewed in this paper) where relatively
high inflation targets are announced, the distinction between the definition of price stability and the inflation target is more
relevant.
8  If inflation as measured by the RPIX is more than one percentage point above or below this target, the Governor of the Bank
of England needs to write an open letter of explanation to the Chancellor. It should be noted that owing to differences in
statistical methodologies and in the coverage of expenditure items, RPIX inflation has historically tended to be higher (by
more than half a percentage point on average over the past decade) than HICP inflation in the UK.
9  Given that not all countries have made an explicit distinction in this respect, our attributions in the table should be taken with
particular caution.
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have announced a specific fixed horizon driving the conduct of their decisions. Such horizons vary in a
range from 1 to 3 years ahead and often correspond to the horizons of the official published forecasts of
the central banks. It should be mentioned that more recently a tendency towards de-emphasising the fixed
horizon in favour of a ‘medium term’ notion can be noted among inflation targeting central banks. The
medium term notion has been adopted by the ECB, the Bank of Australia and more recently by the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ).
10
Only a few central banks have made explicit their ‘ex post’ horizon (or horizon for accountability). The
Bank of England and Norges Bank and the RBNZ prior to the new Policy Targets Agreement (PTA) view
their horizon as being timeless, implying that in principle the inflation target has to be maintained at all
times. In these cases normally a number of escape clauses are provided, i.e. explicit contingencies under
which temporary deviations from the target can be allowed (these normally relate to a number of cost-
push unexpected shocks). The ECB and the RBNZ have adopted a medium term horizon. The Bank of
Australia refers to the average inflation developments over the business cycle.
11
3.  Ranges or point objectives: rationales
As discussed in the preceding section, the specific features of the announced quantitative objectives for
inflation developments vary somewhat across countries, including ranges of various size, ranges with an
explicit focus on the range’s mid-point, point targets with fluctuations bands or point targets. In this
section we review some possible motivations for these different choices that have been proposed either by
central banks, academic experts or observers.
Generally, central banks that have adopted ranges have emphasised the existence of uncertainty related to
future inflation developments and the imperfect controllability of inflation. The advantage of a range, in
this respect, would be that it conveys to the public the important message that the control of inflation is
inherently imperfect and therefore it avoids giving the impression that monetary policy is equipped to (or
might attempt to) fine-tune price developments with a high degree of precision. The size of the range may
thus convey information about the central bank’s assessment of the uncertainty surrounding the effects of
its policies. In this respect, the motivations behind the choice of a range are similar and related to those
behind the choice of a medium-term perspective in the conduct of monetary policy, as described in the
                                                     
10  For example, in New Zealand, the new PTA has officially extended the horizon from the previous 6 to 8 quarters ahead to the
“medium term”. Recently the Bank of England has also referred to the notion of the medium term several times in its recent
press releases on interest rates decisions. For example, on 6 February 2003 the MPC stated: “[…]. In order to keep inflation
on track to meet the target over the medium term, the Committee judged that it was necessary to reduce interest rates by
0.25%”. The recent literature has emphasised the potential problems which may arise with the adoption of a fixed (and
relatively short-term) horizon, e.g. in relation with the possibility of the emergence of asset price bubbles and episodes of
financial crises.
11  It should be noted that the use of the word ‘average’ in the case of both Australia and New Zealand (“future CPI …on
average over the medium term”) might seem to imply a price level target with drift. However, it is not straightforward
(particularly in the case of New Zealand where the word ‘future’ is included) to what extent ex-post deviations of the
expected inflation from the policy target are bygones or not. If they are not corrected, the cumulative long-run effects on the
price level of these short run deviations may drive the CPI far away from the drift.
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objective for credibility purposes. Over relatively short periods of time, deviations from any point
objective may be substantial with potential negative effects on the credibility of the central bank, while a
range enhances the likelihood that inflation developments will be very frequently within the established
objective.
This latter view is not, however, uncontroversial. Bernanke et al. (1999, op. cit.) argue that missing a
range (which may inevitably happen from time to time) may be perceived by the public as a more serious
policy failure than missing a point (which happens continuously and inevitably).
12 Moreover, with a range
in place the public may focus excessively on whether inflation is just inside or just outside of the range,
rather than on the magnitude of the deviations from the mid-point. All this may increase pressure on the
central bank to act vigorously to keep inflation within the range, which may create problems of
instrument instability and excessive volatility in the real economy, particularly if the horizon is short.
13 In
this sense a trade-off may exist between the choice of the size of the range and the length of the horizon
for the conduct of monetary policy. Moreover, careful communication may be needed on the part of the
central bank to avoid the impression that the bounds of the range are seen as implying “hard edges”, i.e.
threshold values which trigger actions in a quasi-automatic fashion.
14
Orphanides and Wieland (2000) point out that the presence of a range target invariably suggests a non-
linearity in the policy response of central banks. Given that under the conventional linear-quadratic
framework used in the analysis of optimal monetary policy, optimal policy is linear and invariant to the
presence of (additive) uncertainty, the presence of a range must imply a departure from the standard
framework. With this in mind, they offer two possible motivations for the adoption of a range and explore
their implications for optimal monetary policy. First, they assume a zone-quadratic objective for the
central bank, that is, a loss function which assigns quadratic loss to inflation outside the target zone and,
implicitly, a near zero loss for inflation outcomes within the zone. Secondly, they explore the possibility
of non-linearities in the short-run inflation-output trade-off, namely, the assumption that inflation is
relatively stable for a range of output gaps and only increases or decreases when the output gap falls
outside this range. Under both types of non-linearities, and under the assumption that the central bank
assigns at least some weight to output stabilisation, monetary policy will be relatively unresponsive to
inflation (and more responsive to output developments) when inflation is within the range inflation
                                                     
12  Similar points have been made by Svensson on various occasions, see e.g. Svensson, L.E.O. (2001), “ Independent Review of
the Operation of Monetary Policy in New Zealand: Report to the Minister of Finance,” www.princeton.edu/~svensson. More
recently he pointed out that a relatively narrow interval (say 1% wide) would avoid the main drawbacks of ranges.
13  Bernanke et al. (1999), op. cit., quote the case of New Zealand as an example in this regard and argue that these problems
played a role in the country’s decision to finally widen the range objective in 1996, from 0-2% to 0-3%.
14  These motivations appear to be behind the choice of the Bank of Canada to emphasise the mid-point of its range, as apparent
from the following quote: “[…] Monetary policy will therefore be directed to moving inflation to the target midpoint over a
six- to eight-quarter horizon. In this way, policy aims at keeping the trend of inflation at the 2 per cent target midpoint. The
target range of ±1% around the target midpoint thus encompasses the outcomes for inflation that are likely to occur most of
the time. This range should be interpreted as a reflection of the short-run uncertainty of outcomes stemming from
unpredictable shocks and not as a measure of the indifference of the Bank as to the outcome”. See “Renewal of the Inflation-
Control Target – Background Information”, Bank of Canada, May 2001, www.bankofcanada.ca.
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on the degree of uncertainty the central bank faces (relative to the size of the range). In particular, the
higher is uncertainty the lower is the zone of inaction and in the limit optimal policy will collapse to the
standard linear-quadratic case (which implies no inaction zone).
Another reason that is often quoted as a motivation for the choice of a range (rather than a point) inflation
objective is the need to preserve flexibility in the management of monetary policy. There are two levels of
arguments in this regard.
First, it is argued that a range also reflects a concern by central bank for macroeconomic stabilisation, in
particular for avoiding excessive output and employment fluctuations when responding to threats to price
stability.
15 In this respect, there is clearly a link between the choice of a range and the horizon for the
conduct of monetary policy (see Section 2 above) and a trade-off may exist between the size of the range
and the length of the horizon adopted for the conduct of monetary policy. Moreover, a range may also be
thought to give more leeway to the central bank to pursue objectives other than inflation, such as output
growth, in case its mandate includes multiple objectives with no priority given to price stability.
16
Second, it has been argued that a range might be seen as preferable if there is the possibility that the
optimal inflation rate for the economy might vary (gradually and moderately) over time. There may be
several reasons for this. For example, structural shocks (such as a permanent rise in productivity growth)
may increase the equilibrium level of the real interest rate of the economy, permitting to balance the costs
of inflation with the benefits (such as those deriving from the existence of a zero lower bound in nominal
interest rates) at a permanently lower inflation rate.
17 Similarly, changes in statistical measurement
methods may permit to reduce the measurement bias in observed inflation and thereby the implicit focal
point within the inflation objective. In these cases, a range objective could at least theoretically
accommodate mild variations in the optimal inflation rate without requiring a change or frequent changes
in the inflation objective.
The two lines of argumentation above also illustrate the possibility that the higher flexibility given by a
range target (relative to a point) may leave open the possibility (or raise the suspicion) of an excessive
degree of discretion in the conduct of monetary policy. In this respect, the trade-off existing for the
society between the benefit from granting the policy maker some flexibility in the conduct of its policy
                                                     
15  See Bernanke et al. (1999), op. cit., pp. 291-293.
16  In this respect, Fed officials have sometimes referred to the fact that a numerical objective for inflation would unduly
constrain the Fed in view of its dual mandate of price stability and long-term output growth; e.g. see the remarks by Governor
D.L. Khon (2003), “Comments on Marvin Goodfriend’s ‘Inflation targeting in the United States’” at the National Bureau of
Economic Research Conference on Inflation Targeting, Florida, January 25, 2003. In this respect, the focus of the Fed on
price stability with no quantitative specification of the inflation objective, may be thought at as implying a range for
allowable inflation outcomes of relatively broad size. This argument is not, however, used by central banks with a mandate
which assigns price stability an overriding role.
17  Another example could be the need of responding in an appropriate manner to episodes of asset price bubbles or financial
instability, which may require in some cases a prolonged deviation from any point target inflation rate, in order to ensure that
the target is met over a longer-run prospective.
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18
In their model, monetary authorities have private information on the state of the economy determining the
optimal inflation rate or target, which remains unknown to the public. The problem of the society is to
find a well-designed rule which gives monetary policy the flexibility to react to its private information,
but at the same time is able to guard against the standard time inconsistency problem arising from the
temptation to stimulate the economy by creating unexpected inflation (à la Barro-Gordon). They find that
the optimal rule is simply achieved by legislating an inflation cap that specifies the highest allowable
inflation rate. The optimal inflation cap (or degree of discretion) is decreasing in the severity of the time
inconsistency problem.
Last but not least, a crucial aspect that is referred to in the discussion on ranges and point objectives
concerns the signalling properties of the announced target. The capability of tightly anchoring inflation
expectations is in fact a crucial motivation for the announcement of a quantitative objective for inflation
in the first place. In this respect, it is often claimed that the signalling properties of a point target are
superior to those of a range. A single number is easier to communicate, may be remembered more easily
and, especially, it provides a more precise focal point for the expectation formation mechanism of agents
in the economy and for co-ordinating their actions.
19
Orphanides and Williams (2003) analyse the effect of the announcement of an explicit numerical inflation
target in a model in which agents have imperfect knowledge about the structure of the economy and rely
on adaptive learning to continuously update their beliefs regarding the dynamic structure of the economy
based on incoming data.
20 In such a framework, effective communication of an explicit inflation target
(and strong emphasis on the primacy of price stability objective) by the central bank can help focus
inflation expectations and thereby reduce the costs associated with imperfect knowledge, thus yielding
superior economic performance.
While clearly the above argument suggest that the adoption of a relatively broad range might result in
lower capability of anchoring inflation expectations relative to a point target, it is less obvious what
difference a relatively small size range (such as those announced by the central banks reviewed above in
Section 2) would make. It seems therefore useful to investigate empirically whether there are any
systematic differences in countries’ ability of anchoring inflation expectations and whether these
                                                     
18  See Athey, S., Atkenson, A. and P.J. Kehoe (2002), “The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Working Paper, November 2002.
19  For instance Svensson (2001), commenting on the ECB’s definition of price stability, claims: “A range provides a less
precise anchor for inflation expectations. There is a big difference between inflation expectations of 2% and 0%. For
instance, wage negotiation differences are often about a few tenths of a percent, and the starting point for the negotiations
(expected inflation plus expected productivity growth) are important”. See Svensson, L.E.O. (2001), “The Fed Does Not
Provide the Solution to the Eurosystem’s Problems”, Briefing paper for the Committee of Economic and Monetary Affairs
(ECON) of the European Parliament for the quarterly dialogue with the President of the European Central Bank,
www.princeton.edu/~svensson.
20  See A. Orphanides and J.C. Williams (2003), “Imperfect Knowledge, Inflation Expectations and Monetary Policy”, paper
prepared for the NBER Conference on Inflation Targeting, January 23-25, 2003, mimeo.
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21 We turn to this
issue in the next section.
4.  Evidence on long-term inflation expectations in selected countries
Exhibiting well-anchored long-term inflation expectations is commonly seen as a desirable feature in any
monetary policy framework. Well-anchored expectations would reflect that the public regards the central
bank and the overall policy framework as deserving a high degree of credibility for achieving its inflation
objective. By contrast, in a low credibility environment, the presence of significant fluctuations in
inflation expectations would tend to hamper the smooth functioning of monetary policy.
In practice, in a given monetary policy framework, long-term inflation expectations are usually
considered to be well anchored if they exhibit limited variability around an intended level. However,
assessing this in practice might not always be a straightforward endeavour.
22 Two types of difficulties in
this respect are relevant: those related to uncertainty about the level at which the central bank intends to
settle long-term expectations and those related to gauging a threshold for volatility in observed long-term
expectations which would seem compatible with well-anchored expectations.
Regarding the first issue, two sources of uncertainty should be highlighted. First, even if the central bank
announces an intended level of inflation, the public may believe that such objective could be changed in
the future. For instance, the central bank might be interested in performing a one-off change in the level
of desired inflation (e.g. the quest for low inflation in the 1980s and part of the 1990s in many industrial
countries). In this case, the above description of well-anchored expectations as stable long-term
expectations would usually not apply and it might even be reversed: a credible disinflationary process
would be characterised by rapidly changing expectations toward the new equilibrium level. Second,
uncertainty in the level at which the central bank intends to anchor expectations may also arise in a
stationary environment if the central bank’s strategy does not include a quantitative announcement of the
inflation objective or definition of price stability or if there is a quantitative announcement which leaves
some room for variability in the intended level of future inflation. In this respect, the evidence presented
in the following attempts to gauge the implications of different types of quantitative announcement (or the
lack thereof) for the ability to anchor long-term inflation expectations by the central bank. An obvious
caveat to this approach is the fact that the stability of inflation expectations depends on the overall
monetary policy framework and not only on the presence of a quantitative announcement for the inflation
objective or its specific features.
                                                     
21  Quite obviously the ability to anchor inflation expectations depends on all the features of the monetary policy frameworks,
including the way of conduct of monetary policy, their credibility and effectiveness in the communication with the public, so
results are not certain a priori.
22  In the case of the euro area, the ECB monitors regularly inflation expectations in the euro area through a number of
indicators, including indicators derived from financial assets, consumer surveys and surveys of professional forecasters. The
ECB conducts its own survey of professional forecasters at a quarterly frequency (e.g. described in ECB Monthly Bulletin,
November 2002). For comparability purposes at an international level this note makes use primarily of measures of long-term
inflation expectations reported by Consensus Forecasts.
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measures of inflation expectations may exhibit some intrinsic volatility independently of the credibility
gained by the central bank. Such volatility may result from measurement problems (e.g. due to changes in
the sample of experts that provide input if expectations are measured through a survey of professional
forecasters or due to shifts in the inflation or liquidity risk premia if they are measured from relative yield
of inflation-indexed bonds). Given the uncertainty surrounding such measurement problems, a natural
way to assess this volatility in a given country is by its relative performance with respect to best
performing countries or economic areas.
As regards the implications of a low level of credibility of the central bank to keep future inflation close
to a given level, recent studies (e.g. Erceg and Levin (2001)
23 and Orphanides and Williams (2002)
24)
have shown that as the degree of uncertainty faced by the public regarding the long-term inflation
objective of the central bank increases, the degree of persistence in inflation could increase substantially,
so that shocks to current inflation could have visible effects on long-term inflation expectations. This
suggests that under a low degree of credibility of the central bank inflation expectations would exhibit (in
addition to relatively large volatility) positive correlation between changes in short-term inflation
expectations (which reflect shocks to inflation) and long-term inflation expectations.
Against this background, long-term inflation expectations in the context of a stable monetary policy
framework could be considered to be well anchored if they exhibit at least two features: First, a low level
of volatility around a given level (which should be compatible with the point or range target in the case
where the central bank makes a quantitative announcement of the inflation objective). Second, a low
degree of correlation between movements in realised inflation and short-term inflation expectations on the
one hand and long-term inflation expectations on the other. These two criteria to assess the stability of
inflation expectations are examined in the next two sub-sections. For this, we examine long-term inflation
expectations proxied by the measures provided by Consensus Forecasts in the period 1990-2002 in a
number of industrial countries (namely, Australia, New Zealand, the U.K., Canada, the U.S., Switzerland,
Sweden and the euro area.
25 (See Annex I for a description of the data).
4.1  The level and volatility of long-term inflation expectations
This section highlights in the first place the patterns in the level and volatility of long-term inflation
expectation from the early 1990s until 2002 in the countries considered, except that for some countries
only shorter periods of observations are available (exact data availability is indicated in Table 3 and
                                                     
23  “Imperfect credibility and inflation persistence”, C. Erceg and A. Levin, mimeo, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, June 2001.
24  “Imperfect Knowledge, inflation expectations and monetary policy”, A. Orphanides and J. Williams, mimeo, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 2002.
25  In addition, patterns in long-term inflation expectations in some of euro area countries –namely, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and Spain- are examined, with particular emphasis on the period 1990-1998. Obviously, any inference on these
countries for the period starting in January 1999 should be made with caution, as at that time euro area countries relinquished
the independent monetary policies, which makes their experience not comparable with those of countries with an independent
monetary policy.
ECB • Working Paper No 273 • September 2003 18Annexes I and II). For this, Table 2 presents summary statistics with average long-term inflation
expectations in a number of sub-periods; in addition, Annex II shows in Displays 1 to 14 a more
comprehensive set of indicators and Charts with inflation expectations developments in each of the
considered countries.
As regards the patterns in the level of inflation expectations across economic areas, and focusing
primarily in the period after the disinflationary process was completed in most countries, the following
conclusions may be extracted. For the U.S., where the central bank does not announce a quantitative
objective for inflation, the level of expectations seems to have stabilised around an inflation rate of 2.5%.
In the case of Japan it should be noted that the level of expectations broadly converges (although with
significant variability, as discussed below) to a rate slightly below 1%, indicating that markets
consistently believe that mild deflation will eventually come to an end. For central banks with an explicit
quantitative announcement of their primary objective, it is noted from Displays 1-14 that in the majority
of cases where either a point or a fully symmetric range is used as the format of the objective, that
inflation expectations have converged to that point or mid-point in the range. This is indeed the case for
the U.K., Sweden (where a focal point is a feature of the objective), Australia (where a symmetric range
is used) and to a large extent also Canada (focal point). In the case of the euro area, Display 1 indicates
that measures of inflation expectations (five years ahead in the case of the ECB Survey of Professional
Forecasters and between 6 and 10 years ahead in the case of Consensus Forecasts) were close to the 2%
mark at the start of Stage Three of EMU, declined somewhat in 2000 and have drifted slightly upwards
since then, to remain stable at about 1.8 to 1.9%.
As regards the trends in the volatility of inflation expectations across economic areas, Table 2 and the
charts and tables in Annex II show that all countries except one experienced a clear reduction in the
volatility of long-term expectations starting in the early 1990s. The only exception to these broad trends is
the case of Japan, where volatility of inflation expectations did not fall.
26
The parallel decline in the volatility of long-term inflation expectations over the 1990s is confirmed in the
tables within Displays 1 to 14 for all countries considered except the case of Japan, which is analysed
separately. This evolution is reflected in particular in the decline in the coefficient of variation of long-
term inflation expectations in all countries except Japan. When the earliest sample (1990-1994) is
considered, countries’ coefficients of variation of long term inflation are in the range of 0.07 (for the
U.S.) to 0.19 (Canada). By contrast, when the most recent sample (1999-2002) is considered, these
figures are in the range of 0.03 (U.S. and Sweden) to 0.10 (New Zealand and Switzerland).
                                                     
26  In order to avoid the difficulties in gauging the quality of the inflation expectations anchor in a context of disinflation, the
analysis focuses mainly on the period after the disinflationary movement (i.e. 1995-2002).
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1990- 1995- 1999-
1994 1998 2002
EURO AREA Average long-term inflation expectations 3.13 2.32 1.82
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.18 0.27 0.09
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.06 0.12 0.05
Standard deviation of realised inflation  - 0.60 0.63
   Memo items: euro area countries:
      FRANCE Average long-term inflation expectations 2.96 2.18 1.63
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.28 0.23 0.09
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.10 0.11 0.05
Standard deviation of realised inflation  0.61 0.65 0.62
      GERMANY Average long-term inflation expectations 2.69 2.21 1.80
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.11 0.15 0.11
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.04 0.07 0.06
Standard deviation of realised inflation  1.78 0.48 0.81
      ITALY Average long-term inflation expectations 3.94 2.43 1.66
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.52 0.58 0.11
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.13 0.24 0.06
Standard deviation of realised inflation  0.87 1.39 0.51
      NETHERLANDS Average long-term inflation expectations - 1.78 1.86
Standard deviation of inflation expectations - 0.10 0.19
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations - 0.06 0.10
Standard deviation of realised inflation  - 0.33 1.04
      SPAIN Average long-term inflation expectations - 2.61 2.33
Standard deviation of inflation expectations - 0.38 0.21
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations - 0.15 0.09
Standard deviation of realised inflation  - 1.25 0.56
SWITZERLAND Average long-term inflation expectations - - 1.63
Standard deviation of inflation expectations - - 0.16
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations - - 0.10
Standard deviation of realised inflation  - - 0.41
SWEDEN Average long-term inflation expectations - 2.43 1.96
Average absolute deviation of expectations from target - 0.18 0.04
Standard deviation of inflation expectations - 0.47 0.05
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations - 0.20 0.03
Standard deviation of realised inflation  - 1.36 0.95
U.K. Average long-term inflation expectations 3.86 2.98 2.33
Average absolute deviation of expectations from target - 0.50 0.18
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.36 0.38 0.10
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.09 0.13 0.04
Standard deviation of realised inflation  2.28 0.66 0.89
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1990- 1995- 1999-
1994 1998 2002
AUSTRALIA Average long-term inflation expectations 4.03 2.99 2.48
Average absolute deviation of expectations from point target -0 . 2 7 0 . 0 5
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.63 0.44 0.07
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.16 0.15 0.03
Standard deviation of realised inflation  1.28 1.91 1.73
CANADA Average long-term inflation expectations 2.99 1.89 1.99
Average absolute deviation of expectations from point target 0.18 0.19 0.06
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.58 0.25 0.10
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.19 0.13 0.05
Standard deviation of realised inflation  2.21 0.54 0.62
JAPAN Average long-term inflation expectations 2.14 1.50 0.88
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.43 0.44 0.34
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.20 0.29 0.39
Standard deviation of realised inflation  1.09 0.97 0.35
NEW ZEALAND Average long-term inflation expectations -1 . 7 8 1 . 8 6
Average absolute deviation of expectations from point target -0 . 5 0 0 . 3 6
Standard deviation of inflation expectations -0 . 1 0 0 . 1 9
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations -0 . 0 6 0 . 1 0
Standard deviation of realised inflation  -1 . 0 2 1 . 3 8
U.S. Average long-term inflation expectations 3.84 3.00 2.56
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.26 0.25 0.07
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.07 0.08 0.03
Standard deviation of realised inflation  0.66 0.63 0.85
(*) Source: Consensus Forecasts. Long term inflation expectations reflects survey evidence relating surveyed experts’ views on
inflation rates in a period between six and ten years ahead. For the euro area, data are constructed by aggregating series from the
five euro area countries listed under memo items in the Table, representing more than 80% of the euro area household
consumption in all periods considered. Annex I provides background information on data sources and elaboration.
(**) For Australia the first year considered is 1991.
Similarly, when the ratio of the standard deviation of long-term inflation expectations to the standard
deviation of realised inflation is considered, all countries are found to have experienced a gradual and
considerable decline in that ratio: Whereas for the earliest sample 1990-1994 the ratio was in the range of
6.2% to 59.8%, in the most recent sample 1999-2002 the range of the ratio was between 4% and 38.1%.
In summary, Table 2 and Displays 1 to 14 in Annex II show that the downward trend in long-term
inflation expectations did tend to be levelled-off in all countries at some point in the second half of the
1990s. From this point, they also tended to exhibit lower volatility. The exception to this trend is the case
of Japan. As shown in the table in Display 12, long-term inflation expectations in Japan declined on
average somewhat over the 1990s. But their volatility has seen only a limited decline, as reflected in the
relatively small declines in the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation between the earliest
sample 1990-1994 and the most recent sample 1999-2002. Furthermore, the average change (in absolute
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27 in long-term expectations increased from 0.33 in the
earliest sample (1990-1994) to 0.5 percentage point in second sample (1995-1998) to remain at that level
in the latest one (1999-2002), as shown in the table within Display 12. By contrast, for all other countries
considered, this same statistic saw a decline or remained broadly unchanged over the 1990s. In particular,
for all countries excepting Japan this measure of volatility of expectations was in the range of 0.04 (U.S)
to 0.33 (Australia) percentage point in the period 1990-1994, while in the period 1999-2002 the respective
range was from 0.05 (Australia) to 0.13 (Switzerland) percentage point.
Overall, looking at the various indicators and with particular reference to the period 1999-2002, the
variability of inflation expectations has been very low in Australia, Canada, the euro area, Sweden, the
UK and the US, with little perceivable differences in performance among these countries
28. Interestingly,
these countries adopted different frameworks to anchor inflation expectations: a point target in the case of
Sweden and the UK, a range in the case of Australia and Canada, a range definition of price stability in
the euro area, and no explicit quantitative reference in the case of the U.S.
In the same period, inflation expectations were slightly less well-anchored, according to most indicators,
in New Zealand and Switzerland, although volatility of expectations in this countries remained at
relatively low levels.
29
All in all, although it is difficult to extract strong conclusions from this evidence, the previous discussion
suggests that the announcement of quantitative references in terms of point targets or ranges for inflation
is not a necessary condition (e.g. U.S.) for good performance at anchoring inflation expectations.
In order to more rigorously compare the degree of volatility in inflation expectations across different
features of the inflation objectives, Table 4 reports the results of a simple panel-data regression of the
form:
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where I, J and t index announcement strategies, countries and time periods respectively. T
J is the total
number of periods in which country J is observed. The term in the left-hand-side in (1) is a function of
long-term inflation expectations. The term Dummy(I) in the right-hand-side is an indicator variable
reflecting the type of implemented strategy (I) relating the announcement of a quantitative target in a
given country (J) and year (t) , as reflected in Table 1, although in many cases it is not straightforward to
                                                     
27  Consensus long-term expectations are reported biannually, as explained in Annex I of this note.
28  For euro area countries, the tables in Displays 3 to 7 indicate a considerable decline in both the level and the volatility of long
term expectations in the period 1999-2002 compared to the longer periods including previous years, particularly in France
and Italy, while less so in Spain and the Netherlands.
29  In the case of Switzerland, results appear to be particularly affected by one observation in 1999, which may of course
represent an outlier.
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countries’ or areas’ strategies in the observed years in line with Table 1 is shown in Table 3 below.
Table 3: Baseline classification of countries’ strategy announcement of inflation objective
No explicit announcement  France (1990-1997) Italy (1990-1998)
Netherlands (1995-1998) U.S. (1990-2002)
Japan (1990-2002) U.K. (1990-1991)
Quantitative definition of price stability euro area (1999-2002) Switzerland (2000-2002)
 (no explicit lower bound) France (1998)
Target range Australia (1995-2002) New Zealand (1995-2002)
Spain (1995-1996) U.K. (1992-1997)
Explicit point target U.K. (1997-2002) Canada (1990-2002)
Sweden (1995-2002) Germany (1990-1998)
Switzerland (1999) Spain (1997-1998)
Obviously, any classification of announcement strategies in narrowly defined categories, as attempted in
Table 3, entails some degree of oversimplification, and therefore alternative classification criteria to the
borderline cases have also been used in the empirical analysis.
 30
The results of the panel estimates are reported in Table 4 below. The term “No explicit announcement”
(which corresponds to the constant term in the regression) captures measured volatility in expectations in
countries that did not implement a quantitative definition of the inflation objective. The other coefficients
reported in Table 4 correspond to the difference in measured volatility in the other categories, relative to
the degree of volatility in countries that did not announce a target.
Overall the results in Table 4 appear to indicate that the precise features of the quantitative announcement
seem to have limited effects on the performance at anchoring long-term expectations.
31
Table 4 also suggests that the announcement of a quantitative objective has tended to contribute to
reducing volatility in long-term expectations. At the same time, volatility of expectations in the U.S.,
where no quantitative objective was announced, turned out smaller than in the control group. Obviously,
these results should be seen with caution, as the analysis is limited by the size of the sample and potential
endogeneity bias in the estimates.
                                                     
30  In this respect, it would seem particularly difficult to classify the announcement strategies of Germany in 1990-1998 and
Switzerland before 2000 in any of the narrow categories in Table 3, given the then prevailing focus on monetary targeting in
these countries. For reasons of simplicity, these countries in those years are classified as implementing a point target in the
baseline case.
31  This appears to be robust also for alternative classifications to the baseline case. In particular, the finding that announcing a
point target does not seem to significantly improve the performance in anchoring long-term inflation expectations is
somewhat strengthened in alternative regressions where Germany (1990-1998) and Switzerland (1998-1999) are classified as
“no explicit announcement”.
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♦  : Volatility of long-term inflation expectations: announcement strategies
            1995-2002     
Coefficient t-value
No explicit announcement (excluding Japan and US) 0.046 3.57
Quantitative definition of price stability -0.031   -1.98* 
Target range -0.030 -1.65
Point target -0.029 -1.56
Japan 0.119      5.48**
US -0.036 -1.64
R-squared                0.239
No. observations                217
(♦ ) Reports results of estimating equation (1):
The coefficient for “no explicit announcement (excluding Japan and U.S.) corresponds to “α ” in equation (1) (i.e. the constant
term). The remaining coefficients correspond to the terms “β (I)” in equation (1).
The terms  (*) (**) indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at (5%-level)(1%-level) respectively.
Table 5 shows similar estimates across economic areas as opposed to across different types of
announcements.
32
                                                     
32  It should be noted that in this case a constant term is not included and thus all coefficients reflect absolute volatility of
expectations in each economic area.
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Coefficient t-value p-value
euro area (1999-2002) 0.016 0.580 0.563
    Memo items: euro area countries (1995-1998)
       France 0.034 1.220 0.226
       Germany 0.015 0.544 0.587
       Italy 0.071 4.030 0.000
       Netherlands 0.003 0.391 0.696
       Spain 0.017 0.122 0.903
Other European countries
Sweden 0.032 1.610 0.109
Switzerland 0.007 0.285 0.776
U.K. 0.025 1.260 0.208
Other OECD countries
Australia 0.020 1.030 0.303
Canada 0.009 0.454 0.651
New Zealand 0.007 0.349 0.728
Japan 0.165 8.350 0.000
U.S. 0.010 0.510 0.611
R-squared                 0.2764
No. observations                 169






































where in this case J indicates an economic region and no ‘regimes’ or announcement strategies considered.
p-values are defined conventionally as the probability that the t-statistic is equal to zero, thus indicating a level of
significance of 5% (1%) if the p-value is equal to 0.05 (0.01, respectively).
Results in Table 5 indicate that the dummy variables that proxy the volatility of long-term inflation
expectations appear significant only in few countries.
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If a central bank is successful at anchoring long-term inflation expectations, it would be expected that
current shocks to inflation would have no visible effect on long-term expected inflation, since over a
number of years (say 6 to 10 years ahead) the effects of the shock would be expected to unwind gradually
and inflation to converge close to the steady-state rate. A simple approach to examine if in an economy
current shocks have no visible impact on long-term expectations would be to test whether revisions in
long-term expectations are correlated with revisions in short-term expectations. To perform this test, the
following regression can be implemented:







J I Dummy E E ε π β π + ⋅ ∆ ⋅ = ∆ ∑ + + 1 10                                              (2)
where as for equation (1) I and J index announcement strategies and countries respectively. The term in
the left-hand-side in (2) is the change in long-term inflation expectations in period t with respect to the
previous observation. The term Dummy(I) in the right-hand-side is an indicator variable reflecting the
type of implemented strategy (I) relating the announcement of a quantitative target in a given country (J)
and year (t). The correlation between short term and long term revisions in regime I is measured by the
coefficient β
I.
Table 6 shows the results of estimating equation (2) in a panel of countries which are classified in terms
of their type of quantitative announcement of the inflation objective (or the lack thereof), as outlined in
Table 3. All coefficients in Table 6 correspond to variables defined as the product of dummy variables
indicating each of the categories or “regimes” in Table 3 in each economic region and changes in short
term inflation expectations in the same region and year.
Overall, Table 6 suggests that, with very few exceptions, the differences in the degree of correlation
between revisions in short-term versus long-term expectations across types of announcements of a
quantitative objective (including the absence of announcement) seems very limited.
It is clear that any interpretation of this evidence should be made with a high degree of caution, in
particular since the size of the sample is not large and the regression leaves out a large number of
important factors (including the fact that in the period 1995-1996 the downward trend movement in
inflation and inflation expectations was still taking place to some extent in many of the countries
considered).
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♦ : Co-movement of short-term and long-term inflation forecasts: announcement strategies
            1995-2002     
Coefficient t-value
No explicit announcement (excluding Japan and US) 0.103 0.89
Japan 0.323   1.94*
US 0.111 0.45
Quantitative definition of price stability 0.047 0.29
Target range 0.015 0.11
Point target 0.079 0.57
R-squared            0.109
No. observations                211
(♦ ) Reports results of estimating equation (2): All reported coefficients correspond to the terms “β
I” in equation (2) (i.e. the
coefficients associated to the interaction term with the product of observed changes in short-term inflation expectations in that
country and a regime dummy associated to the central bank in that country). Short-term inflation expectations refer to 1-year
ahead survey-based measures from Consensus Forecasts, as described in Annex I. Finally the symbol (*) denotes coefficient
statistically significant at 5%-level.
Table 7 reports the results of performing the equivalent of regression in equation (2) for a panel of
countries instead of regimes (i.e. types of announcement of a quantitative objective).
33 From Table 7,
countries with the smallest estimated correlation between revisions in short-term and long-term forecasts
are Germany, New Zealand, The Netherlands, Australia, France and Italy.
Overall, although no strong implications may be extracted from this evidence, the regression results in
Tables 6 and 7 also confirm the claim that the precise form of the announced quantitative inflation
objective (i.e. a target, a range or an explicit upper bound) does not appear to have a strong impact on the
central bank’s performance at anchoring expectations.
                                                     
33 See note to Table 7 for details.
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*: co-movement of short-term and long-term inflation forecasts: countries
    1995-2002     
Coefficient t-value p-value
Euro area (1999-2002) 0.075 0.313 0.754
   Memo item: euro area countries (1995-1998)
     France 0.166 0.631 0.529
     Germany -0.038 -0.174 0.862
     Italy 0.117 0.787 0.432
     Netherlands 0.091 0.578 0.564
     Spain 0.432 2.680 0.008
Other European countries
Sweden 0.180 1.740 0.083
Switzerland 0.307 1.570 0.117
U.K. 0.194 0.693 0.489
Other OECD countries
U.S. 0.216 0.975 0.331
Canada 0.116 0.637 0.525
Japan 0.427 3.540 0.001
Australia 0.123 1.610 0.110
New Zealand 0.020 0.176 0.861
Constant -0.038 -2.280 0.024
R-squared               0.135
No. observations                211
(*) Reports results from estimating the following equation, where in this case J indicates an economic region and no
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Short-term inflation expectations refer to 1-year ahead survey-based measures from Consensus Forecasts, as described in Annex
I. p-values are defined conventionally as the probability that the t-statistic is equal to zero, thus indicating a level of significance
of 5% (1%) if the p-value is equal to 0.05 (0.01, respectively).
5.  Summary and conclusions
This paper reviewed the literature concerned with the trade-offs involved in choosing different formats
for framing the specification of central banks’ primary objective. In addition, it compared the
developments in the level and volatility of inflation expectations in the euro area and a sample of
industrial countries.
ECB • Working Paper No 273 • September 2003 28As regards the rationales for different formats, the available literature suggests that a range format has the
relative advantage of signalling more clearly that price developments are surrounded by large uncertainty
and are only imperfectly controllable, particularly at short horizons. Moreover, a range may give more
flexibility to accommodate the uncertainty in the estimate of, and possible moderate variations. in the
optimal inflation rate. By contrast, point targets have the relative advantage of providing a clear focal
point for firmly anchoring inflation expectations.
As regards the patterns in the level of inflation expectations across countries and economic areas, it is
noted that in the majority of cases where either a point or a symmetric range is used as the format of the
objective, it is observed that inflation expectations have converged to that point or mid-point in the range.
In the case of the euro area, measures of inflation expectations were slightly below 2% since the start of
Stage III of EMU.
As regards the patterns found in the volatility of inflation expectations, although no strong conclusions
may be extracted from evidence based on relatively short samples, the overall evidence shows that long-
term inflation expectations are well anchored in the large majority of countries considered. This is
indicated by both a low and generally decreasing volatility of expectations and a low and a generally
decreasing degree of correlation between revisions in short-term and long-term inflation expectations.
Moreover, the specific features of the inflation objectives do not appear to have a visible effect on the
performance at anchoring inflation expectations. In particular, there does not seem to be evidence that the
announcement of a quantitative objective in the form of a point or of a range for admissible inflation rates
makes any appreciable difference. With regard to the two countries in our review where no numerical
value for the inflation objective was announced, the United States and Japan, inflation expectations
appear to be well anchored in the former but not in the latter. This may suggest that the track record by
the central bank to consistently deliver a given inflation rate is a crucial factor for the anchoring long term
inflation expectations.
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Consensus Forecasts
All the forecasts on inflation used in this paper were drawn from Consensus Forecasts and Asia-Pacific
Consensus Forecasts. Consensus Economics, founded in 1989, is the world’s leading international
economic survey organisation and polls more than 600 economists each month to obtain their forecasts
and views. These surveys cover estimates for the principal macroeconomic variables (including growth,
inflation, interest rates and exchange rates) in over 70 countries. The forecasts are compiled into a series
of publications, among which there are Consensus Forecasts and Asia-Pacific Consensus Forecasts. All
the series on short term inflation expectations (i.e. the annual rate of inflation expected to prevail in the
following year relative to the survey) and long term inflation expectations (i.e. annual rate of inflation
expected to prevail between 6 and 10 years ahead) were drawn from Consensus Forecast, with the
exception of those for Australia and New Zealand from December 1994, for which we consulted Asia-
Pacific Consensus Forecast. Short-term inflation expectations are available on a monthly basis, while
long-term ones are biannual (issues: April and October of each year). Short-term inflation expectations
are available from December 1989, while long-term ones from April 1990, at least for some countries. In
particular, for the regions included in our analysis, long-term inflation forecasts are available from April
1990 for the following regions: U.S., Japan, Germany, Italy, France, U.K., Italy, and Canada. Australia’s
series begins in April 1991. Finally, data for Spain, Sweden, New Zealand, and The Netherlands are
available from April 1995, while for Switzerland the first estimates date April 1998.
As regards the construction of the series of long-term inflation expectations for the euro area previously
to the start of Stage III of EMU, , this series,  results from averaging inflation expectations of Germany,
France, and Italy from April 1990 up to October 1994 (the weights being, respectively, 0.414847,
0.295488, and 0.2896665), and of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and The Netherlands from April 1995 to
October 2002 (weights: 0.334115, 0.237984, 0.233294, 0.127784, 0.066823), based on Consensus
Forecasts information for these countries.
In addition, for each of the economic regions considered, the following statistics are reported for a
number of overlapping periods (see the tables in Displays 1-14).
Average long-term inflation expectations: Reports the average release from Consensus expectations.
Average absolute deviation of inflation expectations from point target. Reports the average of the absolute
value of deviations from observed Consensus long-term expectations to the point inflation target, when
applicable. For comparability, it is also computed for countries which do not have strictly a point target
but where a point reference might be extracted (e.g. the mid point in an announced range for inflation
objective).
Standard deviation of inflation expectations: As a measure of the volatility of inflation expectations, it
reports the standard deviation of Consensus long-term inflation expectations.
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standard deviation may be clouded by the level of inflation, it reports the ratio of the standard deviation
over the average of inflation expectations (which is always positive in the sample).
Standard deviation of realised inflation: reports the standard deviation of headline inflation. The precise
underlying consumer price index is reported in footnotes to the Tables. To facilitate comparability,
observations of headline inflation used to calculate this statistic correspond to the exact same month when
Consensus inflation expectations are reported (thus each statistic reports the exact same number of
observations for the coefficient of variation of realised and expected inflation).
Average absolute period-on-period change in expectations. As an alternative measure of variability of
inflation expectations, it reports the average absolute value of the change in Consensus long-term
inflation expectations relative to the previous release.
Ratio of the standard deviation of expectations over the standard deviation of realised inflation: This ratio
reports the relative volatility of long-term inflation expectations and realised inflation. This is done to
take into account that a fraction of the volatility in long-term expectations could reflect the volatility in
headline inflation emanating from the characteristics of the price index (e.g. as regards  statistical
properties –like the treatment given to durable goods or mortgage payments- or related to structural
features of the economy -related to the size or degree of openness of the economic region).
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industrial countries
34
Display 1: euro area
EURO AREA  1990-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002
Average long-term inflation expectations 3.13 2.32 1.82
Average absolute deviation of expectations from 1.5% - - -
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.18 0.27 0.09
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.06 0.12 0.05
Standard deviation of realised inflation  - 0.60 0.63
Average absolute period-on-period change in expectations 0.11 0.13 0.09
Stand.dev.of expectation over stand.dev.of realised inflation - 44.83 13.48




































































































Upper bound of definition of
price stability ("year-on-year
increase in HICP below 2%")
Stage III 
of EMU
                                                     
34 For all charts and tables in the displays in this Annex, ‘Inflation expectations’ refers always to long-term inflation
expectations from Consensus Forecasts. See Annex I for details on the construction of the long-term inflation
expectations series for the case of the euro area and definition of the reported statistics. For the case of the euro area,
inflation expectations 5 years ahead are reported from the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters. ‘Realised
inflation’ refers to Eurostat’s HICP inflation for the euro area, to RPI inflation in the case of the U.K. and to CPI
inflation in all other cases, as reflected in each of the displays under the chart’s legend.
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(*) Expected annual inflation 5-years-ahead are from ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters, (see e.g. ECB
Monthly Bulletin May 2003).
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FRANCE 1990-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002
Average long-term inflation expectations 2.96 2.18 1.63
Average absolute deviation of expectations from point target - - -
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.28 0.23 0.09
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.10 0.11 0.05
Standard deviation of realised inflation  0.61 0.65 0.62
Average absolute period-on-period change in expectations 0.21 0.10 0.15
Stand.dev.of expectation over stand.dev.of realised inflation 46.29 35.82 14.18
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GERMANY 1990-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002
Average long-term inflation expectations 2.69 2.21 1.80
Average absolute deviation of expectations from point target - - -
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.11 0.15 0.11
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.04 0.07 0.06
Standard deviation of realised inflation  1.78 0.48 0.81
Average absolute period-on-period change in expectations 0.13 0.13 0.13
Stand.dev.of expectation over stand.dev.of realised inflation 6.19 30.35 13.12
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ITALY 1990-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002
Average long-term inflation expectations 3.94 2.43 1.66
Average absolute deviation of expectations from point target - - -
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.52 0.58 0.11
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.13 0.24 0.06
Standard deviation of realised inflation  0.87 1.39 0.51
Average absolute period-on-period change in expectations 0.27 0.30 0.10
Stand.dev.of expectation over stand.dev.of realised inflation 59.80 41.45 20.77
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THE NETHERLANDS 1995-1998 1999-2002
Average long-term inflation expectations 1.78 1.86
Average absolute deviation of expectations from point target - -
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.10 0.19
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.06 0.10
Standard deviation of realised inflation  0.33 1.04
Average absolute period-on-period change in expectations 0.30 0.09
Stand.dev.of expectation over stand.dev.of realised inflation 31.26 18.42
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SPAIN 1995-1998 1999-2002
Average long-term inflation expectations 2.61 2.33
Average absolute deviation of expectations from point target - -
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.38 0.21
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.15 0.09
Standard deviation of realised inflation  1.25 0.56
Average absolute period-on-period change in expectations 0.14 0.14
Stand.dev.of expectation over stand.dev.of realised inflation 30.43 36.80
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Average long-term inflation expectations 1.63
Average absolute deviation of expectations from point target -
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.16
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.10
Standard deviation of realised inflation  0.41
Average absolute period-on-period change in expectations 0.13
Stand.dev.of expectation over stand.dev.of realised inflation 38.13
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SWEDEN 1995-1998 1999-2002
Average long-term inflation expectations 2.43 1.96
Average absolute deviation of expectations from point target 0.18 0.04
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.47 0.05
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.20 0.03
Standard deviation of realised inflation  1.36 0.95
Average absolute period-on-period change in expectations 0.33 0.06
Stand.dev.of expectation over stand.dev.of realised inflation 34.97 5.44
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U.K. 1990-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002
Average long-term inflation expectations 3.86 2.98 2.33
Average absolute deviation of expectations from point target - 0.50 0.18
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.36 0.38 0.10
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.09 0.13 0.04
Standard deviation of realised inflation  2.28 0.66 0.89
Average absolute period-on-period change in expectations 0.24 0.16 0.13
Stand.dev.of expectation over stand.dev.of realised inflation 15.75 58.17 11.58
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AUSTRALIA 1991-1994 1994-1998 1999-2002
Average long-term inflation expectations 4.03 2.99 2.48
Average absolute deviation of expectations from point target - 0.27 0.05
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.63 0.44 0.07
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.16 0.15 0.03
Standard deviation of realised inflation  1.28 1.91 1.73
Average absolute period-on-period change in expectations 0.33 0.23 0.05
Stand.dev.of expectation over stand.dev.of realised inflation 49.55 22.92 4.09
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CANADA 1990-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002
Average long-term inflation expectations 2.99 1.89 1.99
Average absolute deviation of expectations from point target 0.18 0.19 0.06
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.58 0.25 0.10
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.19 0.13 0.05
Standard deviation of realised inflation  2.21 0.54 0.62
Average absolute period-on-period change in expectations 0.25 0.20 0.11
Stand.dev.of expectation over stand.dev.of realised inflation 26.21 45.78 16.09
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JAPAN 1990-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002
Average long-term inflation expectations 2.14 1.50 0.88
Average absolute deviation of expectations from point target - - -
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.43 0.44 0.34
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.20 0.29 0.39
Standard deviation of realised inflation  1.09 0.97 0.35
Average absolute period-on-period change in expectations 0.33 0.54 0.50
Stand.dev.of expectation over stand.dev.of realised inflation 39.27 45.34 96.03
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NEW ZEALAND 1995-1998 1999-2002
Average long-term inflation expectations 1.78 1.86
Average absolute deviation of expectations from mid-point range 0.50 0.36
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.10 0.19
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.06 0.10
Standard deviation of realised inflation  1.02 1.38
Average absolute period-on-period change in expectations 0.10 0.09
Stand.dev.of expectation over stand.dev.of realised inflation 10.16 13.91
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U.S. 1990-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002
Average long-term inflation expectations 3.84 3.00 2.56
Average absolute deviation of expectations from point target - - -
Standard deviation of inflation expectations 0.26 0.25 0.07
Coefficient of variation of inflation expectations 0.07 0.08 0.03
Standard deviation of realised inflation  0.66 0.63 0.85
Average absolute period-on-period change in expectations 0.04 0.13 0.08
Stand.dev.of expectation over stand.dev.of realised inflation 39.26 39.87 8.72
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